## A2 Gov Shutdown

#### Shutdown coming now – GOP will jump off the fiscal cliff

The New York Times 9/18/13 ("The March to Anarchy" The New York Times)

Until now, the only House Republicans pushing for a government shutdown and debt crisis were a few dozen on the radical right, the ones Senator Harry Reid, the majority leader, referred to as “[the anarchists](http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/321835-reid-anarchist-have-taken-over-the-house-senate).” On Wednesday, however, the full Republican caucus, leadership and all, joined the anarchy movement, [announcing plans](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/19/us/politics/house-gop-to-tie-spending-bill-to-health-law-defunding.html) to demand the defunding of health care reform as the price for keeping the government open past Sept. 30.¶ The decision means that a government shutdown next month is now much more likely. In the past, shutdown threats were averted because Republican leaders were willing to negotiate on spending issues, though the spending cuts that resulted were often harmful to important programs. But the health law is not negotiable for President Obama and the Democrats. By choosing this as their live-or-die issue, Republicans are driving straight toward the brink and removing the brake pedal.

#### Disad is not an opportunity cost to the plan – congress could raise the debt ceiling and ban signature strikes

#### The shutdown has no impact –

ABC News 9/19/13 ("Here's the Truth: The Government Doesn't Shut Down")

Here's the truth about a government "shutdown." The government doesn't shut down.¶ So the world won't end if a dysfunctional Washington can't find a way to pass a funding bill before the new budget year begins on Oct. 1.¶ Social Security checks will still go out. Troops will remain at their posts. Doctors and hospitals will get their Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements. In fact, virtually every essential government agency, like the FBI, the Border Patrol and the Coast Guard, will remain open. Furloughed federal workers probably would get paid, eventually. Transportation Security Administration officers would continue to man airport checkpoints.

#### Syria thumps budget and debt

Sargent 9/17/13 (Greg, The Washington Post, "The Big Story This Fall With Be the Divisions Within the GOP")

Well, yes, but “everyone” does not “know this.” High profile pundits such as [Albert Hunt](http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-09-15/obama-s-syria-meanderings-border-on-incompetence.html) and [Stuart Rothenberg](http://blogs.rollcall.com/rothenblog/barack-obamas-sad-sausage-making-foreign-policy/) have both suggested Obama’s standing is taking such a hit from the Syria crisis that it could impair his ability to handle domestic politics. Ruth Marcus [claims](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/ruth-marcus-obamas-style-on-syria-needs-refashioning/2013/09/16/861b8bba-1efb-11e3-94a2-6c66b668ea55_story.html) Obama is so diminished that it could have repercussions in the debt limit and government shutdown fights.

#### No compromise – no Obama credibility

**Baker and Peters 9/17**, Peter, Jeremy, reporters for the New York Times, “As Budget Fight Looms, Obama Sees Defiance in His Own Party,” 9/17, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/18/us/politics/as-budget-fight-looms-obama-sees-defiance-in-his-own-party.html?pagewanted=all

For four years, President Obama counted on fellow Democrats to rally to his side in a series of epic battles with Republicans over the direction of the country. But now, deep in his fifth year in office, Mr. Obama finds himself frustrated by members of his own party weary of his leadership and increasingly willing to defy him. In recent weeks, disgruntled Democrats, particularly liberals, have bolted from the White House on issues like National Security Agency surveillance policies, a planned military strike on Syria and the potential choice of Lawrence H. Summers to lead the Federal Reserve. In private, they often sound exasperated describing Mr. Obama’s operation; in public, they are sometimes only a little more restrained. They complain the White House has not consulted enough and failed to assert leadership. They say Mr. Obama has been too passive and ceded momentum to Republicans. Their grievances are sometimes contradictory; some grouse that he takes on causes he cannot win, while others say he does not fight hard enough for principled positions. The failure to enact tightened gun control laws and the Republican hold on immigration legislation have left liberals little to celebrate this year. “If you read the papers, you almost think the Republicans are in control,” said Senator Bernard Sanders of Vermont, an independent who caucuses with Democrats and vigorously opposed Mr. Summers until he withdrew from consideration. “They’re constantly on the offensive. Democrats are on the defensive.” The lack of strong leadership, he added, has created a vacuum. “I think you’re going to see more independents saying, ‘Mr. President, we look forward to working with you, but we’re not simply going to accept your leadership and your ideas,’ ” he said. “ ‘We’re not going to follow you. You’re going to have to work with us.’ ” Mr. Obama’s trouble with Democrats is not unusual for a second term and could be temporary or episodic. With re-election behind him, members of his party see no need to stick with him to secure another four years. They are also looking ahead to the next election earlier than usual with the emergence of Hillary Rodham Clinton as a front-runner. By the end of his fifth year, President Bill Clinton had alienated liberals with the North American Free Trade Agreement, a welfare overhaul and a balanced budget deal with Republicans. President George W. Bush in his fifth and sixth years was in worse shape with Republicans, who shelved his Social Security overhaul, rebelled against the deteriorating Iraq war and helped sink his Supreme Court nomination of Harriet E. Miers. “It makes it a lot harder when it’s your own party,” said Peter H. Wehner, a top Bush aide at the time. “You can’t fire back with the same intensity and vehemence as when it’s the other party. And it just changes the dynamics — people expect you to be criticized by the other party. When your own party does it, it’s an indication of weakness.” The internecine tension presents a challenge to Mr. Obama as he heads into renewed budget wars with Congress. “It makes a political life for him that’s already hard even harder,” said Jared Bernstein, a former Obama White House economist. “The gridlock he faces from Republicans, especially in the House, is extremely obstructionist to his agenda, so when he runs into Democrats who are blocking him, it becomes insurmountable.”

#### Shutdown doesn’t collapse the economy but means the debt ceiling get raised – this outweighs

Klein 9/12/13 (Ezra, "A government shutdown just became a bit more likely. And that might be a good thing")

A government shutdown wouldn't be the worst thing in the world. It's breaching the debt ceiling that would be a disaster. There are two fiscal crack-ups on offer this fall. One is a government shutdown. That's bad, but it's not a catastrophe. The other is breaching the debt ceiling. That's a complete and utter catastrophe.¶ The timeline here is cold and unforgiving: Absent action, the government shutdown will happen at the end of this month. The debt ceiling could collapse as soon as [Oct. 18](http://wapo.st/19Exdof).¶ If the GOP needs to lose a giant showdown in order to empower more realistic voices and move forward, it's better that showdown happens over a government shutdown then a debt-ceiling breach. A government shutdown is highly visible and dramatic, but it won't actually destroy the economy. So an "optimistic" case might be that there's a shutdown for the first few days of October, the GOP gets creamed in public opinion, the hostage-taking strategies of the party's right flank are discredited, and Washington is at a much better equilibrium by the time the debt ceiling needs to be raised.¶ And yes, I realize that naming that tornado of lunacy the "optimistic" outcome is enough to make anyone pessimistic about the state of American politics. Good. You should be pessimistic about the state of American politics.

#### Economic crisis won’t cause war

Barnett 9—senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC (Thomas, The New Rules: Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis, 25 August 2009, http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules--security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx)

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost two-decade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements. Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn, occasionally pressing the Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: •No significant uptick in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); •The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts (in all the usual places); •Not a single state-on-state war directly caused (and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); •No great improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); •A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and •No serious efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -- discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency. Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and "rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II international liberal trade order.

## A2 Security

#### Pragmatic Congressional action on [signature strikes/drone reform] is critical to garner support and open up space for larger structural change.

Naiman 2012

Robert, policy director at Just Foreign Policy and president of Truthout's board of directors, A Reformist Strategy to Downsize the Drone Strike Policy, http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/12987-a-reformist-strategy-to-downsize-the-drone-strike-policy

I want to talk about what Congress could do about drone strikes in the next one to two years. To begin with, some political context, as I see it. First, I don't think anyone will argue with me if I say that for the last ten years, Congress has done very little. Second, I think it would be extremely helpful if Congress would do something. I think Congress doing something is intrinsically important in itself, in addition to whatever the thing is. The reason is that the media, the public and the administration take cues from what Congress is talking about. If Congress isn't talking about something, then it's perceived as not very controversial. More people would contact Congress if we had a vehicle for them to contact Congress about. Third, I don't think it's as hard for Congress to do things on this as some people seem to think. There's a kind of conventional wisdom that Congress can't do anything because no one cares because no US soldiers are being killed by the policy. I think this conventional wisdom is completely wrong. No US soldiers are being killed in Honduras, and yet,100 members of Congress are willing to sign letters about human rights in Honduras, and these letters get press and pressure the administration. No US soldiers are being killed in Bahrain, but members of Congress are willing to sign letters about human rights in Bahrain, and these letters get press and pressure the administration. Conversely, plenty of US soldiers were killed in Afghanistan before 2009, and Congress didn't do much about that. So, whether or not American soldiers are being killed is not as decisive as some people seem to think. Fourth, there's another conventional wisdom that Congress can't do anything because most Americans support the policy. But in fact, most Americans have no idea what the policy is, so to say that they support it is kind of meaningless. To the extremely limited extent that the administration has deigned to share information publicly, it has made two central claims: that drone strikes are narrowly targeted on top-level terrorist leaders, and that civilian casualties have been extremely rare. The record of independent reporting suggests that these two claims are, as President Obama might put it, the biggest whoppers of the drone strike policy. So, if the public believes that it supports the policy, what the public is in fact supporting is a policy whose only official public notice has been two big whoppers, a policy that does not actually exist in reality on Planet Earth. When the American people find out what the real policy is, I am sure that they will not support it. This is why strategies to force an increase in transparency are key to reforming the policy. Five, I think that a large part of the reason that not much has happened has just been a question of focus. Between 2001 and 2009, very little happened in Congress on the war in Afghanistan. People were focused on the war in Iraq. When troops were drawn down from Iraq and escalated in Afghanistan, people started to focus on Afghanistan, and Congress started taking action. Now that troops are being drawn down from Afghanistan, we have an opportunity to focus on drone strikes. Sixth, Obama is re-elected. That's done. That should create more political space. The shadow of the election will no longer be hanging over all deliberations. Seventh, the issue has gotten much more press attention recently, by which I mean not just reporting on drone strikes, but reporting in detail on specific, particularly egregious and publicly indefensible aspects of the policy, such as attacks on rescuers. Eighth: months ago, we got 26 signers on the Kucinich-Conyers signature strike letter, and that was without a lot of pushing from a lot of groups. (A policy permitting signature strikes, revealed by the Washington Post in May, allows drone pilots to fire on people based on behavior patterns - or "intelligence signatures" - without being required to know the person's identity.) It looks like there are more folks ready to push now. Ninth, it's very likely to be more useful to have a lot of members do something more modest, than to have very few members do something profound. It's more likely to get press; it's more likely to produce the impression that the policy is controversial; it's more likely to show that members care; it's more likely to produce a change in policy. If we can win some changes in the policy, that will prove that the policy can be changed by outside pressure, and that will open space for further reform. Tenth: therefore, in terms of potential Congressional action, we need to look for realistic, pragmatic things that we could do to reform the current drone strike policy by making it smaller. At least some of these things should be things that we can engage people outside the Beltway on, because that's going to lead to a lot more public education and mobilization. So, here are five ideas that we could push. Other ideas are circulating. I think the most important thing at this point is to develop a group of people who are committed to trying to do something realistic and useful. But to start the discussion, here are five ideas that I think are realistic and useful: 1. The Washington Post editorial board has called for the CIA to be taken out of the business of operating weaponized drones. Human Rights Watch made the same call a year ago and reaffirmed this call in April. The program would be declassified, the military is more transparent and accountable to US and international law than the CIA, and the CIA would refocus on its core competence and responsibility of intelligence and analysis. It is a dangerous conflict of interest for the CIA to be running a paramilitary program at the same time as it is responsible for analyzing, reporting to and advising the president on the impact of US policy. As CIA director, Gen. David Petraeus asked for the CIA to have more armed drones. A good first step would be for Congress to say no to this request. The next permanent head of the CIA faces a Senate confirmation hearing. The next head of the CIA could be pressed to oversee getting the CIA out of drone strikes completely as a condition of Senate confirmation. 2. It has been reported in the press and by independent researchers that the administration has targeted rescuers with "secondary" or "follow-up" strikes, and that these strikes have (predictably) killed civilians. Targeting rescuers is illegal under international law, regardless of whether it takes place in a legal conflict or not. The US ambassador to Pakistan has denied that the United States is targeting rescuers or engaging in secondary strikes. Congress could codify the US ambassador's denial by stating that it is US policy not to target rescuers or engage in secondary strikes. Congress could also press administration officials to testify about this policy, on the public record. At the confirmation hearing of the next CIA head, senators could be urged to ask sharp questions about secondary strikes and attacks on rescuers, and be urged to use the confirmation process as leverage to press for ending attacks on rescuers and secondary strikes. 3. When we were in Pakistan on a recent delegation, the (then-acting) US ambassador acknowledged to us that the United States has an official count of the number of civilians it thinks have been killed in Pakistan, and that this number is classified. Congress could ask why this number is classified and press for it to be declassified. Shuja Nawaz of the nonpartisan policy think tank the Atlantic Council has called for the United States to make public a detailed account of the results of each strike, including any collateral deaths. 4. In Afghanistan, civilians who have been harmed by US military action can be compensated. There is currently no program in place to compensate civilians who have been harmed by CIA drone strikes in Pakistan, although according to the Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC), Congress has already authorized and appropriated money that could be used for this purpose. The (then-acting) US ambassador to Pakistan acknowledged that there was no reason in principle the United States couldn't do this; it was just a question of setting up a program and implementing it. Congress could indicate to the administration that it wants to see such a program in place. The existence of such a program would create an official address for civilian complaints and a public mechanism for adjudicating those complaints. It would also force the creation of a public count of civilian casualties and civilian harm. 5. Four of the "signatures" that the United States has reported to be using to target "signature" drone strikes (as opposed to "personality" strikes on known persons) are clearly illegal under international law: "Military-Age Male in Area of Known Terrorist Activity," "Consorting with Known Militants," "Armed Men Traveling in Trucks in AQAP-Controlled Area," and "Suspicious Camp in AQ-Controlled Area." (AQAP stands for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.) Congress could press the administration to say whether it is doing these things, and pressure the administration to stop doing them. Ending these signature strikes could be a price imposed for confirmation of the next CIA head.

#### Perm do both - Structural criticism of drones is important, but regulation is key

Rothenberg 13 (Daniel Rothenberg is a professor of practice at the School of Politics and Global Studies, ASU and the Lincoln fellow for Ethics and International Human Rights Law. He is editing a book with Peter Bergen on drones to be published later this year. “What the Drone Debate Is Really About” http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future\_tense/2013/05/drones\_in\_the\_united\_states\_what\_the\_debate\_is\_really\_about.html)

The term drone draws attention, elicits passions, and sparks heated discussions. Often the debate about drones flattens the complexity of real policy issues as the questions asked demand impossible answers, “Are drones good or bad?” or “Are you for or against drones?” Not surprisingly, thuis approach heightens the tensions attached to debate about drones, turning conversations into arguments and echoing the polarization that characterizes so much of contemporary political discourse. The intensity of interest in drones arose some years after they became a key element of U.S. military operations abroad. Interestingly, after more than a decade at war, drones remain the only military system within an extraordinarily advanced arsenal to have captivated popular attention. And they have done so at a time when the public has grown weary of war and the deep confusions surrounding the objectives, value, and purpose of these conflicts. For many within the military, the intensity of the debate about drones in combat has been perplexing. As they often point out, drones are simply one of a number of military platforms upon which information-gathering technology or weapons are deployed. For tactical purposes, it may make little difference whether a Hellfire missile is launched from a fighter jet or a drone. And, as military experts and knowledgeable observers emphasize, drones do not operate independently—rather, they are part of a complex, multilayered system in which particular technologies, drones and others, are useful only as integrated within a larger strategic vision. That said, much of the discussion of drones focuses not on their use by the military within defined war zones, where domestic and international law applies, but rather to their use by the CIA and other organizations in places where the legality of their deployment is under question, where data are minimal and where secrecy prevails. In this way, covert drone strikes are the latest in a series of interrelated issues—including torture, black sites, and extraordinary rendition—that reflect directly on the meaning, impact, and ethics of U.S. strategy (once called the global war on terror). Yet, even as drones are linked to existing questions of the appropriateness, legitimacy, and potential illegality of U.S. action, they are the only element of this critique linked to advanced technology, with its complex evocation of promise and danger. Drones have become the iconic public image of the U.S. government’s international projection of military force, during a complex and uncertain time when support is waning and there is great confusion as to the purpose of these ongoing conflicts. More recently, public debate on drones has turned to their current and potential use within our country. And, in this context as well, drones have produced tense discussions about multiple issues including protecting privacy, respecting core constitutional rights, and enabling potential abuses of state power. In response, there are demands for increased regulation as well as concerns that new rules will have a profoundly negative effect on our society. Many worry that the use of drones in our country will usher in a new era of intrusive state surveillance and may even be used as a means of attacking and killing American citizens here at home. For those who currently use drones or advocate for their expanded deployment—whether for military or civilian applications—these debates are deeply frustrating. They point out that drones are simply machines, neither good nor bad, not the sort of issue for which one should seek either support or rejection. They point to drones’ capacity to safely, effectively and inexpensively fight fires, monitor weather patterns, spray crops, and provide ongoing real-time information on hundreds of issues. This is why there is an ongoing effort to shift the language of the debate by replacing the popular term drone with one of a number of arguably more accurate—and less politically loaded—alternatives including unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), remotely piloted vehicle (RPV), or remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). Still, drone remains the default term and will be for the foreseeable future. In fact, the lure and power of the word drone provides insight into the true nature and intensity of the debate. Drones have come to us from foreign battlefields and migrated to the domestic policy environment. While drones may be simple and varied machines, the ones we know best bear names that suggest both danger and brutality, the Predator (MQ-1) and the Reaper (MQ-9). Drones embody the glory of American technological superiority and innovation (at least for now) and appear to many as an ideal tool for facing a difficult, distant, and elusive enemy. Yet, woven into their usefulness abroad is a sense that they are the first expressions of a new reality defined by multiple related technologies whose transformative capacities are as dangerous here as they have been proved to be abroad. Drones captivate us. Their sleekly disturbing look, an odd combination of the fragile and the deadly, produces both fascination and fear. The word drone highlights these qualities, depicting a machine that is solitary, potentially autonomous, ever present, and quietly menacing. The truth is that those who suggest that public debate needs to focus clearly on what drones really are and really do, are missing the point. Facts alone will not resolve the heated discussions. Rather the idea of drones and the resulting questions, complex and varied as they are, are enmeshed in powerful narratives of fear and mistrust as drones have become a central element of the contemporary American political imagination. The drone debate is not only about targeted killings abroad or potential invasions of privacy at home; it is about how this emerging technology has come to symbolize the disorder, threat, uncertainty, and fear of our rapidly changing world. The challenge we face as a society is not simply how to regulate drones (which is clearly necessary) but rather how to learn from the passions they inspire such that we connect serious policy debate on emerging technologies with a respect and acknowledgement for the very real fears of so many.

**Turn – signature strikes lead to a dronification of national security – reducing them is key to stopping the executive from using vague identities as a justification to kill**

**Shaw ’13** [Dr. Ian G.R. Shaw, School of Geographical and Earth Sciences at the University at Glasgow, has written extensively on US drone policy and its geopolitical implications, “Predator Empire: The Geopolitics of US Drone Warfare,” <http://wp.vcu.edu/hsep/files/2013/06/predator-drones.pdf>]

In this section I explore how “life” is the target for the Predator Empire.¶ Although I do not want to downplay the role the American military plays in¶ coordinating and performing violence across the globe, my focus is on the¶ CIA’s drone wars because the evidence from the NSC and DSG suggests a¶ diffuse (if by no means singular) drift towards the droniﬁcation of national¶ security. So too does the National Counterterrorism Center’s disposition¶ matrix and John Brennan’s “playbook”66 establish a permanent precedent for¶ extrajudicial strikes that exist outside of Title 10 authorities.67 This means that¶ the CIA will in all likelihood remain heavily invested in targeted killings for¶ decades to come, despite 9/11 Commission recommendations that paramilitary activities are transferred to the Department of Defense.68 The agency’s¶ 2,000-strong Counterterrorist Center has transformed itself from an intelligence gathering machine to a major player in “kinetic operations”.69 But¶ who counts as a “target” is at times ambiguous. As I previously explored in¶ the above NSS and NSC, there is a deliberate widening of the net surrounding who counts as an afﬁliate. If, as Dillon and Reid suggest, “The history of¶ security is a history of the changing problematisation of what it is to be a¶ political subject and politically subject”,70 then the discursive baptism of the¶ afﬁliate marks a new, if not unprecedented political subject. This is further¶ complicated because afﬁliates are not always identiﬁable individuals such as¶ an al-Qa’ida leader in North Waziristan. Instead, and as I will argue in the¶ remainder of this section, afﬁliates can be threatening patterns of life that are¶ coded, catalogued, and eliminated.¶ As the name directly implies, targeted killings usually involve a known¶ target. In February 2011, John Rizzo, the 63-year-old former General Counsel of the CIA, discussed the agency’s practice of targeted killings.71 Analysts and¶ “targeters” located in the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center select individuals for¶ “neutralization” based on intelligence reports. This report must then clear a¶ team of lawyers before it is signed off by the Counsel. But this isn’t always¶ the normal bureaucratic practice. In the summer of 2008, former CIA Director¶ Michael Hayden successfully lobbied President Bush to dispense with drone¶ targeting constraints that were restricted to known individuals72: “For the ﬁrst¶ time the CIA no longer had to identify its target by name; now the ‘signature’¶ of a typical al Qaeda motorcade, or of a group entering a known al Qaeda¶ safe house, was enough to authorize a strike”.73 The devil here is in the¶ detail. Unlike “personality strikes”, where the person’s identity is located on¶ one of the CIA’s classiﬁed kill lists or the disposition matrix, a signature is¶ constructed from observing and cataloguing a pattern of life – coding the¶ behaviour and geography of individuals; targeting their very lifeworld.¶ This new targeting regime may have led to a rapid escalation of drone¶ strikes and an increase of the number of people that were killed in Pakistan.¶ Between 2004 and 2007 there were 9 drone attacks, but between the pivot¶ year of 2008 and 2012, this ﬁgure leapt to over three hundred.74 In Table 1,¶ I have calculated the percentages of militant “leaders” killed in drone strikes¶ in order to illustrate the decreasing number of high-level “commanders” that¶ are subject to the CIA’s strikes. While this in itself does not prove that personality strikes have given way to signature killings, it does at least suggest¶ the widening net of those subject to drone attacks in Pakistan.¶ To illustrate how easily innocent civilians can get caught up in a signature strike, recall the 2010 CIVIC report once again. In one story, the Taliban¶ visited the residence of a man named Daud Khan and demanded lunch. The father reluctantly consented, fearing reprisal if he refused the ﬁghters:¶ “The very next day our house was hit... . My only son Khaliq was killed.¶ I saw his body, completely burned”. In this case, it seems that Khan’s son¶ had unwittingly become “afﬁliated” with the Taliban. Due to the unavoidable¶ intermingling of such militants with the lives of ordinary people, it is likely¶ that signature strikes could have killed many innocent people. According to¶ the 2012 Stanford and NYU report, a signature strike probably took place on¶ March 17, 2011. The CIA ﬁred at least two missiles into a large gathering –¶ a jirga led by a decorated public servant – near a bus depot in the town¶ of Datta Khel, North Waziristan. The US insists that all were militants. And¶ yet, the overwhelming evidence suggests that most of the 42 people killed¶ were civilians.75 Of the four suspected Taliban militants identiﬁed by the¶ Associated Press in this strike, only one has ever been identiﬁed by name.¶ As a 2011 Washington Post report notes, “Independent information about¶ who the CIA kills in signature strikes in Pakistan is scarce”.76 Other ofﬁcials¶ in the US State Department have complained that the classiﬁed criteria used¶ by the CIA to construct a “signature” are too lax: “The joke was that when the¶ CIA sees ‘three guys doing jumping jacks,’ the agency thinks it’s a terrorist¶ training camp”.77¶ Of course, drones continue to target known individuals on kill lists,¶ performing a well-rehearsed “reduction of places and people to an abstract¶ space”,78 but at least since 2008 the Predator Empire has enforced a distinctive twist on a biopolitical logic based on targeting patterns of life.¶ While there is much variation on what counts as biopolitics,79 it was a term¶ ﬁrst coined by Michel Foucault in Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the¶ Collège de France,¶ 80 a series that Chris Philo describes as the “decisive hinge”¶ in Foucault’s “switch from being a critical historian of the body to being¶ the critical historian of population”.81 In classical theories of sovereignty,¶ the sovereign can “either have people put to death or let them live”,82 and¶ its power over life “is exercised only when the sovereign can kill”.83 This¶ sovereign power became supplemented by a new “right to make live and¶ let die”84 in the nineteenth century. This transformation involved a shift from¶ disciplinary technologies that targeted “man-as-body” (what Foucault calls¶ an “anatomo-politics”) to regulatory mechanisms at the level of “man-asspecies” (what Foucault calls a “biopolitics”). Biological processes such as¶ fertility rates became political problems and sites of intervention, where the¶ aim was to “establish a sort of homeostasis”85 within the population which¶ “consists in making live and letting die” and “achieving an overall equilibrium¶ that protects the security of the whole from internal dangers”.86 All of which¶ might be termed “State control of the biological”.87

#### States will always act to preserve security – we should save ourselves

Mearsheimer ‘1 (John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of political science at the University of Chicago and co-director of the Program on International Security Policy, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2001, p. 30-32)

The first assumption is that the international system is anarchic, which does not mean that it is chaotic or riven by disorder. It is easy to draw that conclusion, since realism depicts a world characterized by security competition and war. By itself, however, the realist notion of anarchy has nothing to do with conflict; it is an ordering principle, which says that the system comprises independent states that have no central authority above them.4 Sovereignty, in other words, inheres in states because there is no higher ruling body in the international system.5 There is no “government over governments.”6 The second assumption is that great powers inherently possess some offensive military capability, which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each other. States are potentially dangerous to each other, although some states have more military might than others and are therefore more dangerous. A state’s military power is usually identified with the particular weaponry at its disposal, although even if there were no weapons, the individuals in those states could still use their feet and hands to attack the population of another state. After all, for every neck, there are two hands to choke it. The third assumption is that states can never be certain about other states’ intentions. Specifically, no state can be sure that another state will not use its offensive military capability to attack the first state. This is not to say that states necessarily have hostile intentions. Indeed, all of the states in the system may be reliably benign, but it is impossible to be sure of that judgment because intentions are impossible to divine with 100 percent certainty.7 There are many possible causes of aggression, and no state can be sure that another state is not motivated by one of them.8 Furthermore, intentions can change quickly, so a state’s intentions can be benign one day and hostile the next. Uncertainty about intentions is unavoidable, which means that states can never be sure that other states do not have offensive intentions to go along with their offensive capabilities. The fourth assumption is that survival is the primary goal of great powers. Specifically, states seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order. Survival dominates other motives because, once a state is conquered, it is unlikely to be in a position to pursue other aims. Soviet leader Josef Stalin put the point well during a war scare in 1927: “We can and must build socialism in the [Soviet Union]. But in order to do so we first of all have to exist.”9 States can and do pursue other goals, of course, but security is their most important objective. The fifth assumption is that great powers are rational actors. They are aware of their external environment and they think strategically about how to survive in it. In particular, they consider the preferences of other states and how their own behavior is likely to affect the behavior of those other states, and how the behavior of those other states is likely to affect their own strategy for survival. Moreover, states pay attention to the long term as well as the immediate consequences of their actions. As emphasized, none of these assumptions alone dictates that great powers as a general rule *should* behave aggressively toward each other. There is surely the possibility that some state might have hostile intentions, but the only assumption dealing with a specific motive that is common to all states says that their principal objective is to survive, which by itself is a rather harmless goal. Nevertheless, when the five assumptions are married together, they create powerful incentives for great powers to think and act offensively with regard to each other. In particular, three general patterns of behavior result: fear, self-help, and power maximization.

#### Threats are real and scenario building is the only way to avoid the harmful kinds of securitization – security itself cannot be deconstructed.

Weaver 2k (Ole international relations theory and the politics of European integration, p. 284-285, JT)

The other main possibility is to stress' responsibility. Particularly in a field like security one has to make choices and deal with the challenges and risks that one confronts – and not shy away into long-range or principled trans-formations. The meta political line risks (despite the theoretical commit­ment to the concrete other) implying that politics can be contained within large 'systemic questions. In line with the classical revolutionary tradition, after the change (now no longer the revolution but the meta-physical trans­formation), there will be no more problems whereas in our situation (until the change) we should not deal with the 'small questions' of politics, only with the large one (cf. Rorty 1996). However, the ethical demand in post-structuralism (e.g. Derrida's 'justice') is of a kind that can never be instan­tiated in any concrete political order – It is an experience of the undecidable that exceeds any concrete solution and reinserts politics. Therefore, politics can never be reduced to meta-questions there is no way to erase the small, particular, banal conflicts and controversies. In contrast to the quasi-institutionalist formula of radical democracy which one finds in the 'opening' oriented version of deconstruction, we could with Derrida stress the singularity of the event. To take a position, take part, and 'produce events' (Derrida 1994: 89) means to get involved in specific struggles. Politics takes place 'in the singular event of engage­ment' (Derrida 1996: 83). Derrida's politics is focused on the calls that demand response/responsi­bility contained in words like justice, Europe and emancipation. Should we treat security in this manner? No, security is not that kind of call. 'Security' is not a way to open (or keep open) an ethical horizon. Security is a much more situational concept oriented to the handling of specifics. It belongs to the sphere of how to handle challenges – and avoid 'the worst' (Derrida 1991). Here enters again the possible pessimism which for the security analyst might be occupational or structural. The infinitude of responsibility (Derrida 1996: 86) or the tragic nature of politics (Morgenthau 1946, Chapter 7) means that one can never feel reassured that by some 'good deed', 'I have assumed my responsibilities ' (Derrida 1996: 86). If I conduct myself particularly well with regard to someone, I know that it is to the detriment of an other; of one nation to the detriment of my friends to the detriment of other friends or non-friends, etc. This is the infinitude that inscribes itself within responsibility; otherwise there would be no ethical problems or decisions. (ibid.; and parallel argumentation in Morgenthau 1946; Chapters 6 and 7) Because of this there will remain conflicts and risks - and the question of how to handle them. Should developments be securitized (and if so, in what// terms)? Often, our reply will be to aim for de-securitization and then politics meet meta-politics; but occasionally the underlying pessimism regarding the prospects for orderliness and compatibility among human aspirations will point to scenarios sufficiently worrisome that responsibility will entail securitization in order to block the worst. As a security/securitization analyst, this means accepting the task of trying to manage and avoid spirals and accelerating security concerns, to try to assist in shaping the continent in a way that creates the least insecurity and violence - even if this occasionally means invoking/producing `structures' or even using the dubious instrument of securitization. In the case of the current European configuration, the above analysis suggests the use of securitization at the level of European scenarios with the aim of pre­empting and avoiding numerous instances of local securitization that could lead to security dilemmas and escalations, violence and mutual vilification.

## A2 CP

#### Executive restraint empirically fails- ineffective oversight and allows too much leeway

Alston ‘11 [Philip, professor of law at NYU School of Law and former UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, “The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders,” Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 2, <http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Vol.-2_Alston1.pdf>]

In addition to the PIAB and IOB, one additional body should be ¶ mentioned. It is the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) ¶ which was established on the basis of the 9/11 Commission’s ¶ recommendations.352 Its task is to scrutinize privacy and civil liberties issues ¶ raised by national security policies and programs. It was established by ¶ Congress in 2004, but was poorly structured and under-resourced. In 2007 ¶ it was made independent of the White House, given a bipartisan ¶ composition, and given a subpoena power.353 Since then it has languished. ¶ President Bush nominated some members, but confirmation hearings never ¶ took place.354 Despite strong urging by key officials and civil liberties¶ groups,355 President Obama made no nominations to the Board until late ¶ in 2011.356 It is highly likely that, if ever activated, the PCLOB will concern ¶ itself with domestic civil liberties rather than with the international human ¶ rights implications of national security policies. While such a focus could ¶ still result in actions that would impinge on targeted killings policy, the ¶ principal relevance of this initiative in the present context is to highlight the ¶ reluctance of successive administrations to establish meaningful human ¶ rights counterweights to the activities of the intelligence community.¶ The picture that emerges from this review of executive oversight ¶ bodies with the potential to exercise some genuine scrutiny of a greatly ¶ increased and rapidly expanding targeted killings program is far from encouraging. Near-complete secrecy characterizes the operations of the two ¶ principal bodies, the PIAB and the IOB. What little is known—such as in ¶ relation to the IOB’s inactivity, reluctance and tardiness—would seem to ¶ suggest that the relevant agencies are largely captured by the very ¶ bureaucracies they are supposed to scrutinize. Their role seems to be that ¶ of promoting efficiency, and there is nothing to indicate that they will ¶ scrutinize the design or application of vaguely formulated policies and ¶ practices that give the intelligence community ever-greater leeway to kill ¶ those whom they deem to be terrorists or otherwise deserving of being ¶ included on kill/capture lists. The one encouraging exception cited ¶ above—concerning the CIA’s operations in Guatemala—is entirely ¶ atypical because it involved the killing of an American and, probably even ¶ more relevantly, a self-destructive but ultimately public feud between the ¶ CIA and the U.S. Ambassador in the country.357 Apart from the fact that ¶ these oversight agencies seem determined to provide no convincing ¶ evidence pointing to the effectiveness of the oversight they purport to ¶ exercise, it is also noteworthy that their structures and compositions reflect ¶ all too few of the characteristics that have generally been effective in ensuring independent oversight in comparable contexts.358 Thus, the ¶ activation of the relevant bodies remains at the discretion of the President, ¶ there is no obligation to make appointments within any apparent time ¶ limit, there is almost no public disclosure of information, the principal ¶ expertise of many of the overseers is political rather than technical, and ¶ there is no evidence of any sort to indicate that human rights-related ¶ oversight has been exercised in any way for the past decade or more.

#### Accountability - executive restraint doesn’t solve credibility

Alston ‘11 [Philip, professor of law at NYU School of Law and former UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, “The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders,” Harvard National Security Journal, Vol. 2, <http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Vol.-2_Alston1.pdf>]

This Article has not sought to spell out the options open to the United States in order to bring its conduct within the law. The bottom line is that intelligence agencies--particularly those that are effectively unaccountable--should not be conducting lethal operations abroad. Beyond that proposition, there is a great deal that the CIA could do if it so wished, including making public its commitment to comply with both IHL and IHRL, disclosing the legal basis on which it is operating in different situations involving potential killings, providing information on when, where, and against whom drone strikes can be authorized, and publishing its estimates on the number and rate of civilian casualties. Full transparency is neither sought nor expected, but basic compliance with the standards applied by the U.S. military, and both consistently and insistently demanded of other countries by the United States, is indispensable. Examining the CIA's transparency and accountability in relation to targeted killings also sheds light on a range of other issues that international human rights law needs to tackle in a more systematic and convincing manner. They include the approach adopted by international law to the activities of intelligence agencies, the (in)effectiveness of existing monitoring mechanisms in relation to killings governed by a mixed IHL/IHRL regime, and the techniques needed to monitor effectively human rights violations associated with new technologies such as unmanned drones and robotics. International human rights institutions need to respond more robustly to the growing chorus of proposals that targeted killings be liberated from the hard-fought legal restraints that apply to them. There is a great deal at stake and these crucial issues have been avoided for too long. The principal focus of this Article has been on the question of CIA accountability for targeted killings, under both U.S. law and international law. As the CIA, often in conjunction with DOD Special Operations Forces, becomes ever more deeply involved in carrying out extraterritorial targeted killings both through kill/capture missions and drone-based missile strikes in a range of countries, the question of its compliance with the relevant legal standards becomes even more urgent. Assertions by Obama administration officials, as well as by many scholars, that these operations [\*446] comply with international standards are undermined by the total absence of any forms of credible transparency or verifiable accountability. The CIA's internal control mechanisms, including its Inspector General, have had no discernible impact; executive control mechanisms have either not been activated at all or have ignored the issue; congressional oversight has given a "free pass" to the CIA in this area; judicial review has been effectively precluded; and external oversight has been reduced to media coverage which is all too often dependent on information leaked by the CIA itself. As a result, there is no meaningful domestic accountability for a burgeoning program of international killing. This in turn means that the United States cannot possibly satisfy its obligations under international law to ensure accountability for its use of lethal force, either under IHRL or IHL. The result is the steady undermining of the international rule of law, and the setting of legal precedents which will inevitably come back to haunt the United States before long when invoked by other states with highly problematic agendas.

#### Links to politics – immense opposition to bypassing debate

Hallowell ’13 [Billy Hallowell, writer for The Blaze, B.A. in journalism and broadcasting from the College of Mount Saint Vincent in Riverdale, New York and an M.S. in social research from Hunter College in Manhattan, “HERE’S HOW OBAMA IS USING EXECUTIVE POWER TO BYPASS LEGISLATIVE PROCESS” Feb. 11, 2013, <http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/02/11/heres-how-obamas-using-executive-power-to-bylass-legislative-process-plus-a-brief-history-of-executive-orders/>, KB]

“In an era of polarized parties and a fragmented Congress, the opportunities to legislate are few and far between,” Howell said. “So presidents have powerful incentive to go it alone. And they do.”¶ And the political opposition howls.¶ Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., a possible contender for the Republican presidential nomination in 2016, said that on the gun-control front in particular, Obama is “abusing his power by imposing his policies via executive fiat instead of allowing them to be debated in Congress.”¶ The Republican reaction is to be expected, said John Woolley, co-director of the American Presidency Project at the University of California in Santa Barbara.¶ “For years there has been a growing concern about unchecked executive power,” Woolley said. “It tends to have a partisan content, with contemporary complaints coming from the incumbent president’s opponents.”

#### The plan is key to make congress look more legitimate – solves Obama adventurism and war

**Friedman ’12** [Benjamin H. Friedman is a research fellow in defense and homeland security studies at the Cato Institute, “Drones, Special Operations and Whimsical Wars,” <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/drones-special-operations-whimsical-wars-7085>]

The official rationale for using force across the world is that Al Qaeda is global. But that’s true only thanks to a capacious definition of Al Qaeda that imposes a sense of false unity of disparate groups. The always-overrated remnant of the organization that sponsored the 9/11 attacks barely exists anymore, even in Pakistan. Our counterterrorism efforts are directed mostly against others: terrorists that take up Al Qaeda’s name and desire to kill Westerners but have limited links to the real McCoy, as in Yemen and North Africa, and insurgents friendly to jihadists but mostly consumed by local disputes, such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, Al Shabaab in Somalia and Al Qaeda’s Islamist allies in southern Yemen. Like the phony communist monolith in the Cold War, the myth of a unified, global “Al Qaeda” makes actions against vaguely linked entities—many with no obvious interest in the United States—seem a coherent campaign against globe trotting menace bent on our destruction.¶ The real reason we are fighting so much these days is that war is too easy. International and domestic restraints on the use of U.S. military power are few. And unrestrained power tends to be exercised. Presidents can use it whimsically, at least until they do something costly that creates a backlash and wakes up public opposition. Drones and special-operations forces made this problem worse. Most of the world is what the military calls a permissive environment, especially since the end of the Cold War. Most places lack forces capable of keeping our military out. Many potential allies invite it. The risks traditionally associated with war—invasion, mass death, etc.—are now alien to Americans. Since the draft ended, the consequences of even bad wars for most of us are minor: unsettling media stories and mildly higher taxes deferred by deficits. That’s why, as Nuno Monteiro argues, the U.S. military was already quite busy in the 1990s despite the absence of real enemies.¶ Because war is so cheap, the public has little reason to worry much about it. That leaves elected representatives without any electoral incentive to restrain presidential war powers. No surprise then that the imperial presidency grew as American power did. Technology gains and secrecy exacerbate the problem. Even more than strategic bombing from high altitude, which already prevented U.S. casualties, drones cheapen warfare. Covert raids are riskier, of course, but secrecy limits public appreciation of those risks.¶ The president and his advisors assure us that they use these forces only after solemn debate and nights spent (badly) reading just war theory. But a White House that debates the use of force only with itself short-circuits the democratic process. That is not just a constitutional problem but a practical one. Broad debate among competing powers generally produces better decisions than narrower, unilateral ones. That is why is it is naive to suggest, as John Fabian Witt did last week in a New York Times op-ed, that the executive branch is developing sensible legal institutions to manage the gray area between war and peace occupied by drone strikes. What’s needed are checks and balances. That means Congress needs to use its war powers.¶ First, Congress should rewrite the 2001 Authorization of Military Force, which has morphed into a legal rationale for doing whatever presidents want in the name of counterterrorism. That bill authorized force against the organizers of the September 11 attacks and those who aided them, which seemed to mean Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and maybe Pakistan. The new law should state that acts of war, including drone strikes, in other places require a new authorization of force. If Congress is for bombing stuff in Yemen and Somalia, it should debate those missions. Second, Congress should reform the convoluted laws governing the deployment of special operations forces, making their use more onerous and transparent. Those forces should engage in covert action only after a presidential finding, as with the CIA. Third, Congress should require that taxes or offsets fund wars. That would increase debate about their worth.¶ The trouble, as already noted, is that Congress has no interest in doing these things. Congressional leaders are today more interested in policing leaks about the president’s unilateral exercise of war powers than in restraining them. Short of a military disaster involving special-operations forces or drones, this seems unlikely to change in the short term. In the longer term, we need a restoration of Congress’ institutional identity. Even without an electoral reason, politicians should want to exercise war powers simply because they can—because people like power. That’s the assumption behind Edward Corwin’s notion that the constitution’s is an “invitation to struggle” over foreign policy. Something has obstructed Congress’ desire to struggle. Those concerned by the president’s promiscuous use of force should try to identify and remove the obstruction.

#### Causes nuclear war

**Symonds 4-5**-13 [Peter, leading staff writer for the World Socialist Web Site and a member of its International Editorial Board. He has written extensively on Middle Eastern and Asian politics, contributing articles on developments in a wide range of countries, “Obama’s “playbook” and the threat of nuclear war in Asia,” <http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/04/05/pers-a05.html>]

The Obama administration has engaged in reckless provocations against North Korea over the past month, inflaming tensions in North East Asia and heightening the risks of war. Its campaign has been accompanied by the relentless demonising of the North Korean regime and claims that the US military build-up was purely “defensive”. However, the Wall Street Journal and CNN revealed yesterday that the Pentagon was following a step-by-step plan, dubbed “the playbook”, drawn up months in advance and approved by the Obama administration earlier in the year. The flights to South Korea by nuclear capable B-52 bombers on March 8 and March 26, by B-2 bombers on March 28, and by advanced F-22 Raptor fighters on March 31 were all part of the script.¶ There is of course nothing “defensive” about B-52 and B-2 nuclear strategic bombers. The flights were designed to demonstrate, to North Korea in the first instance, the ability of the US military to conduct nuclear strikes at will anywhere in North East Asia. The Pentagon also exploited the opportunity to announce the boosting of anti-ballistic missile systems in the Asia Pacific and to station two US anti-missile destroyers off the Korean coast.¶ According to CNN, the “playbook” was drawn up by former defence secretary Leon Panetta and “supported strongly” by his replacement, Chuck Hagel. The plan was based on US intelligence assessments that “there was a low probability of a North Korean military response”—in other words, that Pyongyang posed no serious threat. Unnamed American officials claimed that Washington was now stepping back, amid concerns that the US provocations “could lead to miscalculations” by North Korea.¶ However, having deliberately ignited one of the most dangerous flashpoints in Asia, there are no signs that the Obama administration is backing off. Indeed, on Wednesday, Defence Secretary Hagel emphasised the military threat posed by North Korea, declaring that it presented “a real and clear danger”. The choice of words was deliberate and menacing—an echo of the phrase “a clear and present danger” used to justify past US wars of aggression.¶ The unstable and divided North Korean regime has played directly into the hands of Washington. Its bellicose statements and empty military threats have nothing to do with a genuine struggle against imperialism and are inimical to the interests of the international working class. Far from opposing imperialism, its Stalinist leaders are looking for a deal with the US and its allies to end their decades-long economic blockade and open up the country as a new cheap labour platform for global corporations.¶ As the present standoff shows, Pyongyang’s acquisition of a few crude nuclear weapons has in no way enhanced its defence against an American attack. The two B-2 stealth bombers that flew to South Korea could unleash enough nuclear weapons to destroy the country’s entire industrial and military capacity and murder even more than the estimated 2 million North Korean civilians killed by the three years of US war in Korea in the 1950s.¶ North Korea’s wild threats to attack American, Japanese and South Korean cities only compound the climate of fear used by the ruling classes to divide the international working class—the only social force capable of preventing war.¶ Commentators in the international media speculate endlessly on the reasons for the North Korean regime’s behaviour. But the real question, which is never asked, should be: why is the Obama administration engaged in the dangerous escalation of tensions in North East Asia? The latest US military moves go well beyond the steps taken in December 2010, when the US and South Korean navies held provocative joint exercises in water adjacent to both North Korea and China.¶ Obama’s North Korea “playbook” is just one aspect of his so-called “pivot to Asia”—a comprehensive diplomatic, economic and military strategy aimed at ensuring the continued US domination of Asia. The US has stirred up flashpoints throughout the region and created new ones, such as the conflict between Japan and China over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. Obama’s chief target is not economically bankrupt North Korea, but its ally China, which Washington regards as a dangerous potential rival. Driven by the deepening global economic crisis, US imperialism is using its military might to assert its hegemony over Asia and the entire planet.¶ The US has declared that its military moves against North Korea are designed to “reassure” its allies, Japan and South Korea, that it will protect them. Prominent figures in both countries have called for the development of their own nuclear weapons. US “reassurances” are aimed at heading off a nuclear arms race in North East Asia—not to secure peace, but to reinforce the American nuclear monopoly.¶ The ratcheting-up of tensions over North Korea places enormous pressures on China and the newly-selected leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. An unprecedented public debate has opened up in Beijing over whether or not to continue to support Pyongyang. The Chinese leadership has always regarded the North Korean regime as an important buffer on its northeastern borders, but now fears that the constant tension on the Korean peninsula will be exploited by the US and its allies to launch a huge military build-up.¶ Indeed, all of the Pentagon’s steps over the past month—the boosting of anti-missile systems and practice runs of nuclear capable bombers—have enhanced the ability of the US to fight a nuclear war against China. Moreover, the US may not want to provoke a war, but its provocations always run the risk of escalating dangerously out of control. Undoubtedly, Obama’s “playbook” for war in Asia contains many more steps beyond the handful leaked to the media. The Pentagon plans for all eventualities, including the possibility that a Korean crisis could bring the US and China head to head in a catastrophic nuclear conflict.

## A2 T Targeted Killing

#### We meet and our aff is key to topic education

**Zenko ’12** [Micah, Douglas Dillon fellow in the Center for Preventive Action (CPA) at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). Previously, he worked for five years at the Harvard Kennedy School and in Washington, DC, at the Brookings Institution, Congressional Research Service, and State Department’s Office of Policy Planning, “Targeted Killings and Signature Strikes,” June 16, <http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/07/16/targeted-killings-and-signature-strikes/>]

No matter how U.S. officials (secretly) refer to the practice, signature strikes against military-age men have been part of U.S. targeted killings outside of battlefields from their beginning. In fact, the very first targeted killing was a signature strike.¶ After a year-long manhunt and several missed opportunities by Yemeni soldiers, on November 3, 2002, a fusion of human intelligence assets and signals intercepts pinpointed Abu Ali al-Harithi—an operational planner in the al-Qaeda cell that bombed the USS Cole in 2002—and his bodyguards living in the Marib region near the border with Saudi Arabia. Yemeni and U.S. forces on the ground, supported by a Predator drone circling above, were monitoring al-Harithi’s group when they left a compound in two Toyota SUVs. All of the men were in one vehicle and the women in the other. According to an unnamed U.S. official, “If the women hadn’t gotten into another car, we wouldn’t have fired.” (A member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence later wondered, “What do we do, next time, if the women get into the car?”)¶ Reportedly, the National Security Agency (NSA) intercepted a satellite phone call coming from the SUV filled with men. After an NSA analyst—who had listened to tapes of al-Harithi’s voice for years—heard confirming evidence, he shouted: “He’s in the backseat, and he’s giving the driver directions!” With that confirmation, a CIA-controlled Predator drone was authorized to fire a single Hellfire missile, which destroyed the SUV and killed al-Harithi, four unknown Yemenis, and Ahmed Hijazi (otherwise known as Kemal Derwish)—a naturalized U.S. citizen who recruited six men from Lackawanna, New York, to briefly attend an al-Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan. Ultimately, the Lackawanna Six pled guilty to providing material support to al-Qaeda and received sentences ranging from seven to nine years in federal prison.¶ As the Los Angeles Times reported the drone strike: “Even though the CIA wasn’t sure who else was in the car, the customary rules of armed conflict say that anyone sitting next to a legitimate target such as Harithi was, in effect, accepting the risk of imminent death.” (Many international legal scholars would dispute this interpretation.) At the same time, U.S. officials acknowledged that the CIA did not know Hijazi was in the vehicle before the CIA launched the missile, although one later claimed his death was justifiable “collateral damage” since “he was just in the wrong place at the wrong time.”¶ It is plausible that the military-age males who happened to get into al-Harithi’s SUV that day were involved with the suspected al-Qaeda operative in planning terrorist plots. However, there is no way to know this with any certainty, and the Bush administration never presented any supporting evidence to this effect. Moreover, we will never know what specific evidence was used to target al-Harithi, because some of it came from suspected al-Qaeda operative Abd al Rahim al-Nashiri. In 2008, CIA director Hayden testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that Nashiri was one of three detainees that the CIA waterboarded, and information obtained by torture is not admissible in a military commission trial.¶ Whether they are called signature strikes, crowd killing, or Terrorist Attack Disruption Strikes, all have been part of U.S. targeted killings from the start, and continue with the CIA’s tactic of staggered drone strikes to kill rescuers of initial victims. The Obama administration makes the false choice that kinetic counterterrorism options are either “large, intrusive military deployments” or drone strikes (although some signature strikes have been conducted with cruise missiles). Or, as former CIA official Henry Crumpton—who, according to his memoir, authorized the first U.S. drone strike on October 20, 2001, in Afghanistan—crudely described the dichotomy: “Look at the firebombing of Dresden, and compare what we’re doing today.” However, people have the right to disagree with the ethical and moral tradeoffs of how drone strikes are currently conducted, and the unwillingness of the Obama administration to discuss them, as well as Congress’ reticence to question them. After ten years of signature strikes, isn’t this a debate worth having?

#### Counter-interp- “targeted killing” is lethal force against those not in custody- broad definitions are comparatively better than scholars like Anderson- it’s most real world for legal practice

**Guardian ’13** [Jan, translator at the International Monetary Fund, Resident Representative Office in Belarus, “TARGETED KILLINGS: A SUMMARY,” <http://acontrarioicl.com/2013/02/27/targeted-killings-a-summary/>]

Currently there is no legal definition of targeted killings in either international or domestic law.[1] ‘Targeted killing’ is rather a descriptive notion frequently used by international actors in order to refer to a specific action undertaken in respect to certain individuals.¶ Various scholars propose different definitions. Machon, for example, refers to ‘targeted killing’ as an “intentional slaying of a specific individual or group of individuals undertaken with explicit governmental approval,”[2] whereas Solis suggests that for there to be a targeted killing (i) there must be an armed conflict, either international or non-international in character; (ii) the victim must be specifically targeted; (iii) he must be beyond a reasonable possibility of arrest; (iv) the killing must be authorized by senior military commanders or the head of government; (v) and the target must be either a combatant or someone directly participating in the hostilities.[3] But whereas some scholars seek to use a human rights-based definition, [4] others propose those which do not entail the applicability of international humanitarian law. [5]¶ However, such definitions are incorrect for several reasons. First of all, the definition of a ‘targeted killing’ has to be broad enough as to cover a wide range of practices and flexible enough as to encompass situations within and outside the scope of an armed conflict, thus, being subject to the application of both international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as opposed to the definition provided by some scholars and even states themselves.[6] Secondly, one should bear in mind that defining an act as an instance of ‘targeted killing’ should not automatically render the illegality of such an act at stake.[7] Moreover, the definition also has to cover situations where such an act is carried out by other subjects of international law, rather than only by states.¶ Therefore, maintaining an element-based approach and synthesizing common characteristics of multiple definitions, it is more advisable to use the one employed by Alston and Melzer, which refers to targeted killings as a use of lethal force by a subject of international law (encompassing non-state actors) that is directed against an individually selected person who is not in custody and that is intentional (rather than negligent or reckless), premeditated (rather than merely voluntary), and deliberate (meaning that ‘the death of the targeted person [is] the actual aim of the operation, as opposed to deprivations of life which, although intentional and premeditated, remain the incidental result of an operation pursuing other aims).[8]

#### They limit the heart of the topic- most strikes are signature-based, and they only allow bad drones affs that don’t solve

**VanValkenberg 3-2**-13 [Noah VanValkenberg, Contributing Writer for Outside Colby, a non-partisan political publication, “Making Drones More Effective: Refining a Necessary Practice in Warfare,” <http://outsidecolby.com/2013/03/making-drones-more-effective-refining-a-necessary-practice-in-warfare/>]

Drones are a crucial piece of the United States’ global war on terror. They have eliminated dangerous individuals such as Anwar al-Awlaki and other senior members of Al Qaeda. However, there is a significant difference between targeted strikes and “signature strikes”—and the use of the latter is only serving to endanger US security.¶ In a typical targeted strike, high-level terrorists are profiled and their names are passed up the chain of command. The National Security Adviser, in conjunction with the Director of Central Intelligence (CIA), will recommend individuals on this “kill list” to President Obama. Ultimately, the President makes the call of who to strike. This is the way drone strikes should work: a missile is only fired after careful analysis and evaluation by experts, and a decision by the President.¶ Signature strikes work entirely differently. Armed drones often loiter over a specific area with no specific mission. If they see a group of individuals acting suspiciously, a relatively low-level intelligence officer can make the call to shoot. The definition of “acting suspiciously” is particularly problematic, as a man carrying a rifle and riding in a pickup truck in the desert may meet that standard. Signature strikes have killed prominent pro-US Yemeni leaders, as documented in the New York Times, they have stoked significant anti-American sentiment, and they have killed 176 children in Northern Pakistan alone.¶ Currently, signature strikes make up the majority of drone attacks, and the targets’ identities are rarely conclusively known. According to an article published in the Journal of International Criminal Justice by Jens Ohlin, only eight percent of suspected militants killed in signature strikes between 2008 and 2010 were mid- to high-level targets. The rest posed no threat to US national security and the strikes incurred enormous collateral damage.¶ However, that collateral damage is enormous. According to the widely cited study Living Under Drones, published by Stanford and NYU, one signature strike alone killed forty members of a peaceful meeting of tribal elders in Northwest Pakistan. The same study argues that many individuals now refrain from going to funerals, because they are so frequently targeted by signature strikes.